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Abstract 
Pump-and-dump schemes are fraudulent price manipulations through the spread of misinformation and have been 
around in economic settings since at least the 1700s. With new technologies around cryptocurrency trading, the 
problem has intensified to a shorter time scale and broader scope. The scientific literature on cryptocurrency pump-
and-dump schemes is scarce, and government regulation has not yet caught up, leaving cryptocurrencies particu-
larly vulnerable to this type of market manipulation. This paper examines existing information on pump-and-dump 
schemes from classical economic literature, synthesises this with cryptocurrencies, and proposes criteria that can be 
used to define a cryptocurrency pump-and-dump. These pump-and-dump patterns exhibit anomalous behaviour; 
thus, techniques from anomaly detection research are utilised to locate points of anomalous trading activity in order 
to flag potential pump-and-dump activity. The findings suggest that there are some signals in the trading data that 
might help detect pump-and-dump schemes, and we demonstrate these in our detection system by examining sev-
eral real-world cases. Moreover, we found that fraudulent activity clusters on specific cryptocurrency exchanges and 
coins. The approach, data, and findings of this paper might form a basis for further research into this emerging fraud 
problem and could ultimately inform crime prevention.
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Introduction
Cryptocurrencies have been increasingly gaining the 
attention of the public, and their use as an investment 
platform has been on the rise. These digital currencies 
facilitate payments in the online sector without the need 
for a central authority (e.g., a bank). The market for cryp-
tocurrencies is rapidly expanding, and at the time of writ-
ing currently had a market capitalisation of around 300 
billion US dollars (CoinMarketCap 2018) making it com-
parable to the GDP of Denmark (Cryptocurrency Prices 
2018). Despite the vast amounts of money being invested 
and traded into cryptocurrencies, they are uncharted 
territory and are for a large part unregulated. The lack 
of regulation, combined with their technical complex-
ity, makes them an attractive target for scammers who 
would seek to prey on the misinformed. One such scam 
is known as a pump-and-dump (P&D), where bad actors 
attempt to make a profit by spreading misinformation 
about a commodity (i.e., a specific cryptocurrency coin) 
to artificially raise the price (Kramer 2004). This scam has 
a long history in traditional economic settings, going as 
far back as London’s South Sea Company in the 1700s 
(Brooker 1998), then found a natural home in penny 
stocks and on the Internet (Kramer 2004; Temple 2000), 
and has now recently appeared in cryptocurrency mar-
kets (Khan 2018; Mac and Lytvynenko 2018; Martineau 
2018).
The academic literature on cryptocurrency (crypto) 
P&D schemes is scarce (for an exception, see the recent 
working paper of Li, Shin, & Wang, 2018). Thus, this 
paper will give an overview of what is currently known 
about the topic from blogs and news sites. To provide a 
theoretical angle, economic literature related to the topic 
is examined, and this information synthesised with cryp-
tocurrencies by highlighting the similarities and poten-
tial differences. As these patterns are a type of anomaly, 
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literature on anomaly detection algorithms is also dis-
cussed. The goal is to propose some defining criteria for 
what a crypto P&D is and to subsequently use this infor-
mation to detect points in exchange data that match 
these criteria, forming a foundation for further research.
What is a pump‑and‑dump scheme?
A pump-and-dump scheme is a type of fraud in which the 
offenders accumulate a commodity over a period, then 
artificially inflate the price through means of spreading 
misinformation (pumping), before selling off what they 
bought to unsuspecting buyers at the higher price (dump-
ing). Since the price was inflated artificially, the price usu-
ally drops, leaving buyers who bought on the strength of 
the false information at a loss. While we do not provide a 
rigorous crime script analysis (see  Borrion 2013; Keatley 
2018; Warren et al. 2017) here, Fig. 1 can be viewed as a 
script abstraction of three main stages—accumulation, 
pump, and dump. The accumulation phase usually occurs 
incrementally over a more extended period of time, in 
order to avoid raising the price before the pump.
What are cryptocurrencies?
Cryptocurrencies are a digital medium of exchange, and 
they usually rely on cryptography instead of a central 
institution to prevent problems like counterfeiting. For 
example, the most popular cryptocurrency is Bitcoin 
(BTC), and some of its benefits are that it allows for trust-
less and de-centralised transactions since it is impossible 
to reverse a payment, and there are no third parties (e.g., 
banks) involved (Nakamoto 2008). In traditional financial 
systems, a customer trusts the third-party (e.g., a bank) 
to update their ledger to reflect the customer’s accounts 
balance. To the contrary, with Bitcoin, this ledger is dis-
tributed across a network, and everyone on the network 
possesses a copy and can—in principle—verify its con-
tents. That public ledger is known as the blockchain and 
is the core technology upon which Bitcoin and many 
other cryptocurrencies rest. There are now many differ-
ent types of cryptocurrencies, with less widely known 
ones referred to as ‘altcoins’, and they all run on slightly 
different technical principles, with different utilities and 
benefits (Bitcoin Magazine 2017). Besides Bitcoin, some 
of the other currently more popular cryptocurrencies 
include Ethereum (https ://ether eum.org/), Ripple (https 
://litec oin.org/), and Litecoin (https ://litec oin.org/).
Aims of this paper
In this paper, we set out to achieve three primary goals. 
First, absent a body of academic research on cryptocur-
rency pump-and-dump schemes, we provided an initial 
working formalisation of crypto P&Ds identifying cri-
teria that might help in locating and ideally preventing 
this emerging fraud problem. Second, we utilise these 
indicators and propose an automated anomaly detection 
approach for locating suspicious transactions patterns. 
Third, to better understand the crypto P&D phenom-
enon, we zoom in on the exchange level and on the cryp-
tocurrency pairings level. The overarching aim of this 
paper is to spark academic interest in the topic and to 
introduce P&Ds as an emerging problem.
Pump‑and‑dump schemes in the traditional economic 
context
In the early eighteenth century, con artists who owned 
stock in the South Sea Company began to make false 
Fig. 1 Schematic abstraction of the three phases of a pump-and-dump operation
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claims about the company and its profits. The goal was to 
artificially raise the price of the stock, and then sell it off 
to misinformed buyers who were led to believe that they 
were buying a promising commodity. This was referred 
to as the South Sea Bubble and serves as an early docu-
mented example of a P&D scheme (Bartels 2000; Brooker 
1998).
In modern times, P&D schemes have predominantly 
been Internet-based focusing on so-called “penny” or 
“microcap” stocks, which are smaller companies that 
do not meet the requirements to be listed on the larger 
exchanges such as the NASDAQ (Dugan 2002; Temple 
2000). Microcap stock exchanges are not held to the same 
standard of regulation, which implies that there is usually 
not as much information about the companies that are 
listed making them easier to manipulate. For example, 
in the US, large public companies file publicly available 
reports with the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) 
which are often analysed by professionals (US Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission 2017). Access to and the 
verification of information is typically more difficult with 
microcap companies. Misinformation about the stocks is 
often spread through email spam which has been found 
to have a net positive effect on the stock price (i.e., the 
spam is effective in increasing the price, see Bouraoui 
2009). In the United States, it is illegal to run a P&D 
operation on penny stocks, and there are multiple cases 
of people having charges pressed against them for their 
participation in a P&D scam (“Developments in Banking 
and Financial Law: 2013,” 2014; Yang and Worden 2015).
Pump‑and‑dump schemes in the cryptocurrency context
There is currently a lack of academic literature on cryp-
tocurrency pump-and-dump schemes, so this section 
seeks to give an overview of the current landscape of 
cryptocurrency P&D schemes as they have been realised 
in various blog posts and news articles. In the cryptocur-
rency context there is an overall slightly different modus 
operandi than in the traditional context of penny stocks; 
specifically, this has been seen in the rise of dedicated 
public P&D groups. These groups have emerged in online 
chat rooms such as Discord (https ://disco rdapp .com) and 
Telegram (https ://teleg ram.org) with the sole purpose 
of organising pump-and-dump scams on select crypto-
currencies (Fig. 2). The number of members in some of 
these groups is reported to have been as high as 200,000, 
with smaller groups still running about 2000 (Martineau 
2018). Price increases of up to 950% have been witnessed, 
demonstrating the extent of manipulation these groups 
are capable of (Thompson 2018). For these P&D groups 
to achieve the best results, several reports of activity 
show that they almost exclusively target less popular 
coins, specifically those with a low market cap and low 
circulation, since they are deemed easier to manipulate 
Fig. 2 Example of a pump-and-dump chat group with over 40,000 members. Left: Telegram group ‘Rocket dump’. Right: Corresponding exchange 
data (Binance) of the targeted coin (Yoyo) showing the effect of the pump. The yellow, purple, and maroon lines represent the moving average for 
the last 7, 25, and 99 days respectively
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(Khan 2018; Mac and Lytvynenko 2018; Town 2018). Esti-
mating the full scope of the damages caused by crypto-
currency pump-and-dumps is difficult; yet there is some 
evidence to show that such schemes are generating mil-
lions of dollars of trading activity. The Wall Street Jour-
nal published an investigative article that looked at public 
pump-and-dump groups and 6 months of trading activ-
ity. They found $825 million linked to pump-and-dump 
schemes, with one group alone accounting for $222 mil-
lion in trades (Shifflett 2018). This gives a glimpse of how 
much monetary activity is generated by these groups, the 
impact of which could be even greater as many groups 
presumably operate in private or invite-only groups.
The pump-and-dump procedure usually consists of 
the group leaders declaring that a pump will take place 
at a particular time on a particular exchange, and only 
after the specified time will the coin be announced (see 
Fig.  2). After the coin is announced members of the 
group chat try to be amongst the first to buy the coin, in 
order to secure more profits. Indeed, if they are too slow, 
they may end up buying at the peak and be unable to sell 
for a profit. The ‘hype’ around buying the coin once the 
pump is announced is due to the short timescale of these 
schemes: Martineau (2018) reported on two pumps that 
reached their peaks within 5–10 min. During the pump-
ing phase, users are often encouraged to spread misin-
formation about the coin, in an attempt to trick others 
into buying it, allowing them to sell easier. The misin-
formation varies, but some common tactics include false 
news stories, non-existent projects, fake partnerships, 
or fake celebrity endorsements (Martineau 2018; Town 
2018). Consider the example where a group of offenders 
impersonated Internet entrepreneur John Mcafee’s twit-
ter account @OfficialMcafee by including an extra ‘l’ 
in the username (Mac and Lytvynenko 2018). The fake 
account sent a positive tweet about a particular altcoin 
and all the users in the P&D group were told to retweet 
it. Within 5  min. The price of the coin had gone from 
$30,- to $45,-, collapsing back down to $30,- after about 
20 min. Anything which creates a general air of positiv-
ity is fair game because the goal is to dump their coins 
on unwitting investors who have not done their due dili-
gence, by preying on their fear of missing out on the next 
big crypto investment.
In a move to secure profit for themselves, many pump-
and-dump group leaders will often use their insider 
information to their advantage: because they know which 
coin will be pumped, they can pre-purchase the coin for 
a lower price before they announce it. This guarantees 
them profit while leaving other users to essentially gam-
ble on whether or not they can predict the peak. The fear 
of missing out and the potential to beat the odds might 
drive prospective cryptocurrency investors into joining a 
pump. Group leaders can also guarantee profits by offer-
ing access to the pump notification at an earlier stage 
prior to the group-wide announcement, in exchange for 
payment. Even a few seconds of temporal advantage are 
sufficient to potentially place buy orders before others, 
and thereby obtain cheaper coins, hence increasing the 
buyer’s benefit from the of the pump-and-dump opera-
tion (Martineau 2018).
Due to the fact that the technology behind crypto-
currencies is relatively new, and that most exchanges 
are unregulated, pump-and-dump manipulation is cur-
rently  not always illegal; and even where it is, it cannot 
always be easily enforced. However, governing bodies are 
beginning to realise the problem, and in the United States 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission has issued 
guidelines on how to avoid P&D scams, as well as offer-
ing a whistle blower program (U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission 2018).
Defining a cryptocurrency pump‑and‑dump
Mitigating and preventing pump-and-dump schemes 
will require knowledge about their operation, and thus 
the detection of these pump-and-dump schemes is a step 
towards the goal of mitigation. To begin searching for 
and identifying potential P&D type patterns in exchange 
data, a working definition for what constitutes a P&D is 
needed. A proposal for defining criteria will be given in 
this section by summarising the insights regarding tradi-
tional and crypto P&D schemes that have been outlined 
in the previous section. Table 1 summarises some of the 
key similarities and differences with the respect to the 
target, tactic, and timescale of traditional penny stock 
and crypto pump-and-dump schemes.
Table 1 indicates that a crypto P&D seems similar to a 
penny stock P&D in that assets that share the same prop-
erties are targeted. However, in general, it appears that as 
a result of different tactics the time scale has been nar-
rowed and moved towards near real-time. Just as the 
digitisation of information via the Internet increased the 
Table 1 Comparison of  traditional and  crypto pump-and-
dump schemes
Traditional Crypto
Target Low market cap Low market cap
Low volume Low volume
Low price Low price
Lack of reliable information Lack of reliable informa-
tion
Tactic Misinformation Real-time misinformation
Privately organised (smaller scale) Public or private group 
scams (larger scale)
Timescale Medium (days to weeks) Short (minutes to hours)
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rate of P&D scams on penny stocks, so too it seems the 
digitisation of currency itself has increased the rate and 
speed at which a P&D can take place.
Using the identified characteristics of crypto P&Ds 
allows us to formulate criteria that could be helpful in 
detecting P&D patterns in exchange data (Table 2). Spe-
cifically, we argue that indicators of P&Ds can be subdi-
vided into breakout indicators which refer to the signals 
that will always be present during a pump-and-dump, 
and reinforcers which refer to indicators which may help 
increase the confidence that the observed data point 
is the result of manipulation. The volume and price are 
discussed with an estimation window, referring to a col-
lection of previous data points, of some user-specified 
length. For example, a moving average over a previously 
defined time period could be used, which would allow for 
discussing spikes with regards to some local history. This 
is not to say that the proposed criteria are sufficient to 
encompass all crypto P&Ds. Instead, we chose to resort 
to conservative criteria that are necessary for a P&D and 




To obtain data for analysis, the CCXT (Ccxt 2018) library 
was used which provides a unified way to programmati-
cally access the data from a variety of cryptocurrency 
exchanges using the python programming language. 
Despite the unified access, the exchanges still differ in the 
amount of historical data they serve, and in the crypto-
currencies, they have listed. Therefore, decisions had to 
be made on what data to obtain.
Data availability statement
The data and code to reproduce the analysis and data 
retrieval are publicly available at https ://osf.io/827wd /.
Format of cryptocurrency exchange data
Cryptocurrencies are listed on exchanges in symbol 
pairs denoting which currencies are trading for which. 
For example, to trade Litecoin (LTC) for Bitcoin (BTC), 
the symbol pair listed is “LTC/BTC”. Exchange data 
are returned as a set of Open High Low Close Volume 
(OHLCV) entries, detailing the trading data for that par-
ticular moment in time. Table 3 shows an example of the 
OHLCV terminology in its raw representation and Fig. 3 
shows the candlestick chart representation of OHLCV 
data. The top and bottom wicks represent the highest 
and lowest value respectively, while the coloured candle 
represents whether the closing price was higher than the 
opening price (green) or lower than the opening price 
(red). The top of a green candle is the closing price, and 
the bottom is the opening price, and vice versa for a red 
candle. Candles can represent a variety of timeframes, 
but they often represent 30  min, 1  h, or 24  h. Smaller 
candle sizes mean more data per time period, so usu-
ally the smaller the candle size, the fewer days one can 
retrieve from an exchange, due to imposed limitations 
on the amount of data retrievable using their API. One-
hour candles were chosen as a compromise between the 
resolution of the data and the amount of historical data 
available.
Obtaining the data
The CCXT library (https ://githu b.com/ccxt/ccxt) sup-
ports access to 115 different cryptocurrency exchanges. 
However, not all of these permit the public retrieval 
Table 2 Indicators of  pump-and-dumps per  temporal 
dimension and indicator type
A (+) denotes an increase in confidence for a pump, while a (−) denotes a 
decrease in confidence. A symbol pair is a term used to denote which currency 
is trading for which, thus BTC/USD is a symbol pair representing that Bitcoin is 
being traded for US dollars
Temporal dimension
Real time indicators Post‑pump indicators
Breakout indicators
Volume Has the volume at the 
current data point 
been significantly 
higher than in the 
estimation window?
Was there a decline 
in volume after 
the event window 
where a pump was 
detected?
Price Has the price at the 
current data point 
been significantly 
higher than in the 
estimation window?
Was there a decline in 
price after the event 
window where a 
pump was detected?
Reinforcers
Market cap Is the market cap of the coin relatively low? 
(+)
Number of exchanges Whether the coin is listed on multiple 
exchanges and the indicators only spike on 
one (+)
Whether the coin is listed on multiple 
exchanges and the indicators spike on 
multiple exchanges (neutral)
Whether the coin is not listed on multiple 
exchanges (+)
Symbol pair Whether the coin is trading for BTC or some 
other cryptocurrency (+)
Whether the coin is trading for USD or some 
other fiat currency (−)
Table 3 An example row of OHLCV data
Timestamp Price Trading 
volume
Open High Low Close
2018-04-20 
01:00:00
0.11804 0.11882 0.11758 0.11881 181.16102255
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of historical data. After filtering for those conditions, 
24 exchanges remained. To make the results more 
robust, the 24 candidate exchanges were filtered fur-
ther to exchanges with at least 50 symbol pairs and at 
least 20  days of historical 1-h OHLCV data. In total, 
five exchanges matched all the criteria, and 480 candles 
(~ 20  days) of data for every available symbol pair were 
pulled from each of these exchanges (see Appendix).
Analytical approach
A successful P&D will often exhibit a marked spike in 
price and volume (see Table 2) that can easily be detected 
by human observation. However, with hundreds of 
exchanges and symbol pairings, and trading transactions 
not bound to specific times during the day, it is imprac-
tical and infeasible to resort to a manual approach for 
the detection of P&Ds only. Therefore, we resorted to an 
automated detection approach using anomaly detection.
A brief introduction to anomaly detection
Data points which do not conform to the rest of a 
dataset are often referred to as anomalies or outliers. 
Anomaly detection is the process of identifying these 
non-conforming points (Chandola et al. 2009). Anomaly 
detection techniques can be broadly categorised into 
supervised and unsupervised anomaly detection. Super-
vised anomaly detection relies on a training data set to 
learn what “normal” is for the domain. The latter hinges 
on the ability to acquire an adequately sized training set, 
something which is often challenging. Conversely, unsu-
pervised techniques rely on the assumption that anoma-
lies are a rare occurrence in the data to prevent an excess 
of false signals. Here, it is the researcher’s or analyst’s task 
to determine the parameters that constitute an anomaly.
Types of anomalies
There are various types of anomalies, which have been 
grouped into three major categories by Chandola et  al. 
(2009): point anomalies, collective anomalies, and con-
textual anomalies. Point anomalies are merely points in 
the data which are anomalous to the rest of the data. An 
example would be an unusually large purchase relative 
to an individual’s historic spending behavior. Collective 
anomalies, on the other hand, refer to a situation in which 
one single data point may not be anomalous by itself. 
Instead, a co-occurrence or temporal proximity of anoma-
lous data points might indicate behavior that is anomalous 
(e.g., a human electrocardiogram in which a single low 
point would not necessarily be anomalous, but consecu-
tive low values would be indicative of a problem). Finally, 
contextual anomalies (also known as ‘conditional anoma-
lies’, Song et al. 2007) are data points which would only be 
considered anomalous in specific contexts. For example, a 
warm temperature in the winter would be anomalous, but 
in the summer would be considered normal.
Anomaly detection in the context of crypto P&D schemes
In the context of this paper, unsupervised anomaly detec-
tion will be the focus, as no labelled training data is cur-
rently available for cryptocurrency pump-and-dump 
schemes  (see Discussion). Conditional anomalies con-
sider contextual information about the setting (Song et al. 
2007). This is described through indicator variables, of 
which the values may be directly indicative of an anom-
aly, and environment variables, whose variables are not 
directly indicative of an anomaly. The indicator variables 
are determined to be anomalous depending on the val-
ues of the environmental variables. In the current context 
this means the goal is to locate the breakout indicators, 
with respect to the reinforcers (Table 2). For the scope of 
this paper, we do not consider the reinforcer of whether 
a symbol pair was present on multiple exchanges, due to 
the amount of data available. Thus, the goal is to locate 
corresponding price and volume spikes of coins with 
a low market cap that are trading for other cryptocur-
rencies. Due to the nature of P&D schemes, pumps are 
Fig. 3 An example of a candlestick chart for the YOYOW/BTC trading pair
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inherently local phenomena, so the goal is to detect local 
anomalies concerning recent history (i.e., to detect local 
conditional point anomalies).
Anomaly anatomy
The anomaly detection technique utilised is a threshold-
ing technique, inspired by previous research regarding 
denial of service attacks on a network (Siris and Papaga-
lou 2004). For a particular value, a simple moving average 
is computed by taking the average of previous values in a 
given time window, the length which is known as the lag 
factor. In this way, one can compare a value to the trend 
over a time period, as opposed to a singular value, allow-
ing for the detection of local anomalies in comparison 
to recent history. This type of thresholding algorithm, 
allows us to provide a functioning baseline which further 
research could then expand upon with more sophisti-
cated algorithms. Additionally, as more is learned about 
cryptocurrency pump-and-dump schemes, it is likely 
that more domain information (e.g., certain times, coins, 
or trading patterns) can be incorporated into the algo-
rithms in an effort to increase the detection accuracy.
Price anomaly
If the high price at any given point is greater than the 
computed anomaly threshold for that point, then the 
point is determined to be anomalous. The anomaly 
threshold is computed using a given percentage increase 
ǫ , a lag factor γ and the simple moving average µγ (x) over 
the closing price. An instance x is a particular observa-
tion in the time series that is associated with the respec-
tive OHLCV values. In this case, x and γ can be 
considered as datetime objects, therefore x − γ would 
indicate moving backwards in the time series by a factor 





which is defined for all x where x − γ ≥ 0 . The threshold 
for any given point after the time lag is defined as 
ǫ · µγ (x) giving us the point anomaly function:
Volume anomaly
The volume anomaly is defined almost identically to the 





 , resulting in:
(1)price_anomaly(x) =
{
True, xhigh > ǫ · µ(x)




True, xvolume > ǫ · µ(x)
False, xvolume ≤ ǫ · µ(x)
Pump anomaly
The goal is to detect local conditional point anomalies, 
that is the co-occurrence of both a price anomaly and a 
volume anomaly. Additionally, the contextual informa-
tion of whether or not the coin has a low market cap or is 
a crypto/crypto trading pair can be considered. There are 
perhaps other contextual indicators that could be inves-
tigated, though for the scope of this paper, only the two 
mentioned above will be looked at.
Low market cap
The market cap of a coin is defined as its price times the 
supply, and represents a way of judging the popularity, 
or size, of a coin. The market cap data were pulled from 
https ://coinm arket cap.com/. The top ten coins from 
the dataset and the percent of the total market cap they 
account for are shown in Table  4. From this it can be 
seen that the top ten coins account for over 85% of the 
total market capitalisation, implying that a vast majority 
of coins have a much smaller market cap relative to the 
top. For the rest of this paper, “low market cap” will be 
defined as any coin below the 75th percentile (0.029%) of 
the total market cap.
Results
This section investigates various values for the different 
parameters and shows how changing these affects the 
results found, with the goal of providing a suggestion for 
balanced parameters. Hopefully, these parameters could 
then be taken to a real-time system, to be further moni-
tored and tuned as time progresses.
Locating crypto pump‑and‑dumps
It is possible to formulate expectations based on the 
domain information presented in earlier sections. Since 
low market cap coins are targeted more often, we would 
expect to see more P&Ds amongst that group of coins. 
Table 4 The top 10 coins by percentage of market cap
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Similarly, crypto/crypto symbol pairs would also be 
expected to exhibit more P&D activity. Additionally, 
since this paper only simulates real-time detection, 
it is possible to look forward in time, and see which 
of the alleged pumps were followed by a marked drop 
in price, which could be an indication of users dump-
ing their coins, making it more likely that the preced-




The idea behind the initial parameters for the detection 
system was to start off relatively ‘weak’, to give an initial 
starting point. We chose a 12 h estimation window, 25% 
volume increase and a 3% price increase. The results show 
that the 25% volume increase threshold was perhaps too 
low, due to the abundance of volume spikes found. Simi-
larly, the 3% increase threshold for the price spikes also 
proved to be a bit too low, as indicated by (Table 5). This 
led to finding over 9000 alleged pump-and-dumps across 
the dataset, which is an average of about nine P&Ds per 
coin over 20 days. While these may be interesting points 
to investigate, making the parameters stricter could help 
reduce false positives (i.e., false flags). Ultimately the 
goal is to find a set of balanced parameters that filter the 
points detected down to a more reasonable number that 
can then be further assessed by humans. The percentage 
of spikes that were found to have corresponding price 
dips was quite high with the initial parameters (90%), but 
this could be due to the vast number of spikes detected, 
to begin with. Figure 4 shows an example of an annotated 
candlestick chart using the initial parameters. 
Strict parameters
We increased the estimation window to 24  h, so it 
required a more drastic change in comparison to the 
average. Additionally, the volume and price thresholds 
were increased to 400% and 10% respectively (Fig.  5). 
This led to detecting 920 alleged pump-and-dumps over 
20 days, about 0.5 P&Ds per symbol. Price dips followed 
only 50% of the alleged pumps, and the total number of 
pump-and-dumps was consequently lower than with the 
initial parameter set.
Balanced parameters
With the information gained from the previous two 
parameter sets, we attempted to find a balance between 
the two. The estimation window was returned to 12 h to 
constrain the search locally, and the volume and price 
thresholds were a compromise between the initial and 
strict parameter values, at 300% and 5% respectively. 
This resulted in about 1.6 pump-and-dumps per sym-
bol, for a total of 2150 over the 20 days of data (Fig. 6). 
Moreover, 75% of the alleged pumps were found to have 
corresponding price dumps; which could mean that in a 
real-time system, these parameters could lead to detect-
ing points that would often be flagged for further inves-
tigation because they are possibly indicative of a P&D 
scheme.
Closer inspection of the balanced parameter set
The results of the balanced parameter set were investi-
gated closer to identify P&D dynamics at the exchange- 
and symbol pair-level. To do so, we filtered the results to 
only include observations where the P&Ds detected were 
on crypto/crypto symbol pairs with a low market cap.
Table 5 Results of the anomaly detection for three different parameter sets
Alleged pumps = pumps detected in real-time without taking information about whether the price drops afterwards; pump-and-dumps = those which are followed 
by a price dip of the rolling average of the previous observation plus one standard deviation; % of P&D = the percentage of the alleged pumps which were actually 
followed by price dips; % of crypto/crypto pairs = the percentage of all P&Ds which are made up of crypto/crypto trading pairs; % of low market cap P&Ds = the 
percentage of all P&Ds which are made up of low market cap coins
Initial parameters Strict parameters Balanced parameters
# of alleged pumps 9668 920 2150
# of pump and dumps 8738 485 1617
% P&D 90.4% 52.7% 75.2%
P&D/symbol 8.94 0.50 1.66
Crypto/crypto pair P&D % 96.1% 97.9% 97%
Low market cap P&D % 77.5% 84.9% 81.76%
Parameter estimation window 12 h 24 h 12 h
Parameter volume increase 25% 400% 300%
5%
Parameter price increase 3% 10%
Parameter price drop Rolling average + 1 SD Rolling average + 1 SD Rolling average + 1 SD
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Exchange‑level findings
The number of P&Ds can be investigated on an exchange 
level, offering insight into which exchanges may be suit-
able targets for further investigation and mitigation tech-
niques. An illustration of how the percentage of symbols 
analysed relates to the percentage of pumps detected 
is shown in Fig.  7. The exchanges Binance and Bittrex 
account for more of the pumps than the relative num-
ber of symbols analysed, suggesting these exchanges are 
utilised more for P&D schemes than others. Conversely, 
the exchange Kraken accounts for almost 6% of the sym-
bols, yet less than 1% of the pumps. This is perhaps best 
explained by the fact that Kraken is one of the more regu-
lated US-based exchanges, and deals mainly with crypto/
fiat currency pairs, as opposed to crypto/crypto. These 
findings suggest that exchanges which offer more regu-
lated trading would be less susceptible to P&D schemes.
Symbol pair‑level findings
Breaking down the pump-and-dumps on a symbol level 
allows for a look into which cryptocurrencies, are dis-
proportionately often affected, and hence more vulner-
able (Table 6). The data show that the most P&Ds for one 
symbol pair was 13, with the vast majority of symbols 
having between 0 and 3 P&Ds. This is consistent with 
the notion that specific coins may be targeted more often 
than others. Also interesting to note is that five of the 
top ten most pumped coins were pumped on the Bittrex 
exchange. Further research could perhaps investigate the 
properties of these coins, in an attempt to see if there are 
links between the most pumped coins.
Figure  8 shows almost 9  days of candlestick data for 
the coin with the most P&D patterns detected. The indi-
vidual spikes have been muted in the figure, to highlight 
only the pump-and-dumps. The resulting graph depicts 
rather suspicious trading activity, with many periods of 
lower price and volume, followed by significant spikes in 
both. During the 9-day period shown eight pumps were 
detected. This type of trading activity would be consist-
ent with the activity of P&D groups organising multiple 
attacks on a single vulnerable coin. Regardless of whether 
it is directly the result of nefarious activity, it is still a pat-
tern which raises question.
Real‑world detectability
A core test of a pump-and-dump identification system 
is its real-world detectability. We used pump-and-dump 
schemes that we were explicitly orchestrated in online 
Fig. 4 Candlestick chart with anomaly detection indicators for the initial parameter set
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chat groups as the ‘gold standard’ of confirmed cases. 
Albeit to a smaller extent, this source of confirmed P&Ds 
allows us to look at the detectability on a case-wise basis. 
The confirmed P&Ds were obtained by monitoring two 
pump-and-dump groups, Moonlight Signal (ca. 3000 
members) and Crypto Trading™ (ca. 56,000 members) 
and observing their announcements. Using this infor-
mation, we illustrate two cases where our system (with 
the balanced parameter set) successfully detected a con-
firmed P&D, and two cases where our system could not 
clearly identify the P&D.
Successful detection
Case 1 In Case 1 (Fig.  9) the coin that was to be vic-
timised was announced on the 17th of August 2018, at 4 
p.m. As a result of their coordinated efforts a large price 
and volume spike is visible, beginning exactly at the time 
at which the announcement took place. Our system was 
able detect the anomalous spikes, and correctly flagged 
the strange trading activity as being the result of a P&D.
Case 2 The announcement time for the P&D in Case 
2 (Fig.  10) was the 21st of August 2018, at 4 p.m. Once 
again, the warning signals of corresponding price and vol-
ume spikes are present, and the system correctly marks the 
strange activity at the announced starting time as fraud-
ulent. In this case we also observe the price and volume 
beginning to increase just prior to the announcement time, 
perhaps indicating insider trading by the group leaders.
Unsuccessful detection
Case 3 The pump announcement in this case was given 
on the 4th of September 2018, at 3:30 p.m. Once again, we 
observe corresponding price and volume spikes (Fig. 11), 
yet in this case our system failed to mark them as being 
Fig. 5 Candlestick chart with anomaly detection indicators for the strict parameter set
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Fig. 6 Candlestick chart with anomaly detection indicators for the balanced parameter set
Fig. 7 The percentage of symbols and alleged pumps per cryptocurrency exchange
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the result of a pump-and-dump scheme. The reason for 
this is that the price continued to climb for a while after 
the pump, instead of immediately dumping. Thus, we 
can observe that sometimes the momentum caused by a 
pump group may actually persist for a period of time (in 
this case about 24 h). The coin being pumped in this case 
(RDN) was also pumped by the same group about 13 days 
previously (see “Case 2”); lending support to the idea that 
certain coins are targeted more often than others.
Case 4 In Case 4 (Fig. 12) the pump announcement was 
made at 4 p.m. on the 3rd of September 2018. Similarly, 
to Case 3, our system again fails to mark the anomalous 
spikes as a pump-and-dump, for the same reason of the 
price not dipping quickly enough afterwards. In order to 
correctly identify these cases in which the price main-
tains momentum for some time after the announcement, 
a potential improvement could be made to the algorithm 
whereby decreasing volume is also taken into considera-
tion. That way, if either the price, or the volume dips, it 
is counted as a P&D, as opposed to only relying on price 
dips. Additionally, in this case, we see that the follow-
ing day a P&D is detected by our system, though it is 
unknown whether this is a result of additional targeting 
by the group, or merely a false positive.
Discussion
This paper attempted to introduce to the crime sci-
ence community the problem of cryptocurrency pump-
and-dump schemes. With cryptocurrencies becoming 
increasingly popular, they are also becoming a more 
likely target for criminal activity. Cryptocurrency pump-
and-dump schemes are orchestrated attempts to inflate 
the price of a cryptocurrency artificially. We identified 
breakout indicators and reinforcers as criteria for locat-
ing a pump-and-dump and investigated the data using an 
anomaly detection approach. While the choice of param-
eters that define an anomaly is inherently subjective, we 
Table 6 Findings for the symbol pair-level inspection of alleged pump-and-dumps
Top 10 symbols ranked by # of pump‑
and‑dumps
Distribution of pump‑and‑dumps
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observed that a balanced approach between the naïve 
initial parameters and the strict parameters might help in 
flagging suspicious trading activity. We were also able to 
show that using a limited set of parameters it is possible 
to detect pumping activity in the data as well as subse-
quent dumping activity. Moreover, we monitored two 
pump-and-dump groups in order to obtain several cases 
of real life pump-and-dump schemes which we then 
applied our detection algorithm to, in order to demon-
strate its performance in real scenarios.
Pump‑and‑dumps as a challenge for crime science
Besides locating potential pump-and-dumps, we found 
evidence of clustering in the data. The vast majority of 
the coins are ones with a low market cap while the top ten 
coins accounted for 85% of the market cap. Furthermore, 
the final distribution of the pump-and-dumps showed 
that about 30% of the symbols accounted for roughly 80% 
of the pumps, indicating that even amongst low market 
cap coins, some coins are targeted more frequently than 
others. Translated to the environmental criminology lit-
erature, this pattern resembles repeat victimisation (Far-
rell and Pease 1993; Kleemans 2001; Weisel 2005; Farrell 
2015). If a P&D chat group, for example, finds a suitable 
coin that they targeted successfully before, it is possible 
they may be more likely to perform another pump on 
that same coin; an example of this was shown in the 
case study section, where the group Moonlight Signal 
targeted the same coin (RDN) twice, in about a 2-week 
period. The clustering can be exploited for preventative 
purposes since efforts can be concentrated towards the 
clusters, finding out what makes them attractive targets, 
and implementing strategies to help mitigate potentially 
nefarious activity. Ideas from situational crime preven-
tion, for example, such as increasing the risk or effort 
required to commit a P&D could also serve as use-
ful methods for prevention (Clarke 2012). Consider an 
exchange which requires additional verification for users 
trading certain symbol pairs which are determined to 
be vulnerable. Such an intervention would increase the 
effort required to trade and hence to pump the vulner-
able coin. When considering how to increase the risk, an 
example could be a system in which the automated detec-
tion of anomalous trading activity is used in cooperation 
with humans. That system could mark suspicious points 
which observers may then investigate further, increasing 
the chances that such P&D schemes are detected.
Fig. 8 A candlestick chart of the most pumped coin
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A major challenge for pump-and-dump prevention 
might lie in coordinating the efforts between private bod-
ies such as cryptocurrency exchanges and government 
bodies. While governments are catching up on the prob-
lem and have allocated more resources to the mitigation 
of pump-and-dump schemes, exchanges might have little 
incentive to cooperate because they benefit from trad-
ing activity on their platforms. Finally, a move towards 
more government regulation—in our data less regulated 
exchanges were targeted disproportionately more fre-
quently—might undermine the very concept of crypto-
currency trading as a decentralised exchange without 
government interference. An interdisciplinary, problem-
oriented approach from both the practitioners’ and the 
research community seems a path worthwhile exploring 
in the mitigation of cryptocurrency pump-and-dump 
schemes.
Limitations
In the current investigation, we resorted to publicly 
available data and provided a framework for the future 
analysis of cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps. However, 
several limitations merit attention. First, the accuracy of 
flagging an alleged pump-and-dump is dependent upon 
the parameters chosen and cannot be ascertained absent 
a ground truth of confirmed pump-and-dumps. Our 
analysis should be treated as a first attempt to place the 
topic in the academic literature. Second, the dataset only 
covers 20 days of data with hourly granularity. While this 
was sufficient for the scope of this paper, future research 
Fig. 9 The chart depicts the results of a pump-and-dump promoted by the group Moonlight Signal, which was signalled to commence at 4 pm 
(UTC) on the 17th of August. Anomalous price and volume spikes at the specified time are clearly visible, and the suspicious activity was correctly 
marked as a P&D scheme by our detection system. Symbol: OAX/BTC. Exchange: Binance
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would want to attempt to collect more substantial quanti-
ties of data and at a smaller granularity (e.g., per minute). 
Third, as with any flagging system, there is a decision to 
be made how many false positives are acceptable (i.e., 
incorrectly flagged coins). Arguably, an exchange would 
want to avoid announcing a coin of being used for fraud-
ulent activity if this were not the case. This compromise 
is particularly complex in real-time settings so an inter-
esting alternative avenue for future research might be to 
move towards the identification of early warning signals 
that can highlight suspicious trading at a point in time 
where the costs of false positives are relatively low (e.g., 
in the rather lengthy, low-activity accumulation phase 
preceding a pump). It is important to recognise the pres-
ence of both false positives and false negatives in any 
P&D detection system. In order to minimise the likeli-
hood of Type I errors (i.e., false positives), the parameters 
for the detection algorithm can be set stricter (e.g., larger 
price or volume increases) which in turn  increases the 
likelihood of committing a Type II error (i.e., incorrectly 
missing a real pump-and-dump; false negative). Thus, a 
cost for both Type I and Type II errors needs to be deter-
mined, and a balance struck between the two. The only 
way to be entirely confident that a particular set of price 
and volume spikes is the result of a P&D group, is to cross 
reference those spikes with a group’s intent to manipu-
late. Thus, a desirable area for future research would be 
to create of a database of confirmed pumps. While labour 
intensive to do in a fully manual way, the creation of 
such a database could likely be achieved through a smart 
combination of automated and manual tasks (e.g., an 
automated filtering system with human review). Such a 
database could be used as a means of testing the accuracy 
Fig. 10 The chart depicts the results of a pump-and-dump promoted by the group Moonlight Signal, which was signalled to commence at 4 pm 
(UTC) on the 21st of August. Anomalous price and volume spikes at the specified time are clearly visible, and the suspicious activity was correctly 
marked as a P&D scheme by our detection system. Symbol: RDN/BTC. Exchange: Binance
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of a detection algorithm, as well as allowing for the use of 
supervised machine learning methods.
Future research
Two lines of research seem particularly interesting for an 
extension of cryptocurrency pump-and-dump identifica-
tion. First, identifying vulnerable coins and understand-
ing the characteristics of those coins that are repeatedly 
targeted in more detail would allow for efficient resource 
allocation of detection systems (e.g., those involving both 
automated systems and human judgment). Second, mov-
ing away from exchange trading data, the modus oper-
andi of pump-and-dumps could be examined in more 
detail. A particularly promising path for future stud-
ies could be the linguistic analysis of the coordination 
of pump-and-dumps in online chat groups, on the one 
hand; and the means by which misinformation about 
specific coins is spread on, for example, social media, on 
the other hand.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to provide a first look into 
research for cryptocurrency pump-and-dump schemes. 
A historical basis for the phenomenon was described 
with literature from traditional economics and synthe-
sised with the currently available information on cryp-
tocurrency P&D schemes. We proposed a set of defining 
criteria that could help describe a crypto P&D and 
showed how an anomaly detection technique could be 
used to detect patterns of suspicious activity. Ultimately, 
it is the hope that the information presented in this paper 
will serve useful as a basis for further research into the 
detection of these fraudulent schemes.
Fig. 11 The chart depicts the results of a pump-and-dump promoted by the group Moonlight Signal, which was signalled to commence at 
3:30 p.m (UTC) on the 4th of September. While our system correctly marked the corresponding price and volume spikes at the specified time, it 
failed to identify them as being the result of a pump-and-dump. Symbol: RDN/BTC. Exchange: Binance
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Fig. 12 The chart depicts the results of a pump-and-dump promoted by the group Crypto Trading™, which was signalled to commence at 4 p.m 
(UTC) on the 3rd of September. In this case we once again observe that the system detects large corresponding price and volume spikes at the 
announced time, however it does not identify these anomalies as being the result a P&D. Symbol: TRIG/BTC. Exchange: Binance
Table 7 Overview of  obtained data between  2018-04-20 
00:00:00 to 2018-05-10 23:00:00




Binance 302 480 20
Bittrex 242 480 20
Kraken 57 480 20
Kucoin 295 480 20
Lbank 81 480 20
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